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RESTORING THE BALANCE: THE HAMDAN
DECISION AND EXECUTIVE WAR POWERS

Seth Weinberger*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In November 2001, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a former driver for Osama bin Laden,
was detained in Afghanistan by U.S. soldiers and subsequently transferred to the
Guantanamo Bay Detention Center in June 2002. In July 2003, President George Bush,
pursuant to his November 13, 2001, authorization of military tribunals to try alien enemy
combatants, 1 announced that Hamdan was to be designated as an enemy combatant and
therefore eligible for trial by military tribunal. 2 The tribunal began in August 2004 but
was halted in November as the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that
the military tribunals violated both U.S. military law and U.S. obligations under the
Geneva Convention, in particular the requirements that detainees during time of war
3
must be treated as prisoners of war unless a special hearing board determines otherwise.
In July 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. District reversed the lower court's
opinion, 4 and, in the following November, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case. 5 Chief Justice John Roberts recused himself due to his participation in the appeals
court decision, 6 and in July 2006, the Court ruled 57to 3 that the military tribunals
violated U.S. military law and the Geneva Conventions.
There were many arguments on which the Supreme Court upheld Hamdan's8
petition, including the applicability of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
and Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 9 However, perhaps the most
important impact of the ruling, not only for Hamdan and other proclaimed enemy
combatants but for the scope and nature of executive power itself, is the implication of
the decision for presidential war powers. 10 It is this aspect that this article examines.

* Assistant Professor, Department of Politics and Government, The University of Puget Sound.
1 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
2.

Adam Liptak, Tribunals Move from Theory to Reality, N.Y. Times A12 (July 4, 2001).

3. Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004).
4
5.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).

6. Id at 2750.
7. Id. at 2798.
8.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisonersof War (Aug. 12, 1949), 6 U.S.T. 3316,

9. 10 U S.C. § 836 (2000).
10. The New York Times referred to the Hamdan decision as "a defining moment in the ever-shifting
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The Hamdanl l decision, particularly when viewed in conjunction with the
Hamdi12 decision of two years earlier, represents a resetting of the balance of executivecongressional power during times of war. Hamdan fits into a long historical framework
of Supreme Court case law, stretching as far back as the Bas v. Tingy 13 decision in 1800.
This framework, combined with presidential precedent and congressional actions (or
inactions), creates an understanding of executive power during times of war that gives
the president wide latitude in the deployment of force and conduct of hostilities. At the
same time, it gives to Congress the critically important power of determining whether
prosecution of the conflict demands that the president be granted extraordinary powers to
act in the legislative arena.
The decision in Hamdan restores the balance to congressional-executive war
powers that have steadily been misaligned by the growth of presidential power. 14 The
logic of the Supreme Court's decision rehabilitates the importance of a critical yet oft
ignored and underappreciated tool: the formal declaration of war. Hamdan reemphasizes the limitations of executive war powers in the absence of a formal
declaration of war by Congress. Such a declaration, as opposed to any other kind of
alternative sanction of force, functions as a broad authorization of legislative power to
the president. Thus, a comprehensive understanding of congressional-executive war
powers can be developed that receives support from the Hamdan decision. While the
president has the power to send troops into conflict when it is determined to be necessary
to do so, the president may not take actions of a legislative nature. Hamdan makes it
clear that, if and when the president deems such legislative activity essential,
authorization from Congress is required. 15 And while Hamdan establishes that such
authorization may take the form of a specific law permitting the president to take specific
actions, 16 this article argues that a formal declaration of war would serve the same
purpose. Consequently, the importance of congressional war powers are, at least to some
degree, enhanced in any conflict such as the on-going "War on Terror" that will involve
action in the legislative sphere. The congressional power to declare war serves as a
critical check on the ability of the executive to expand presidential power in times of
war.

balance of power among branches of government that ranked with the [C]ourt's order to President Richard M.
Nixon in 1974 to turn over the Watergate tapes, or with the [C]ourt's rejection of President Harry S. Truman's
seizing of the nation's steel mills." Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try
Detainees, N.Y. Times Al, A 17 (June 20, 2006).
1I.Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. 2749.
12. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
13. 4 U.S. 37(1800).
14. On the issue of the expansion of presidential war powers at the expense of congressional authority,
review Mark E. Brandon, War and the American ConstitutionalOrder, in The Constitutionin Wartime: Beyond
Alarmism and Complacency 11-38 (Mark Tushnet ed., Duke U. Press 2005). Brandon writes "the story of
American constitutional politics with respect to institutional relations in the context of military conflict has
been one of steady erosion of Congress's power to prevent, confine, or even direct military action and of steady
accretion of executive decision and control." Id. at 23. See also infra nn. 26, 29, 38.
15. Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2774-75.
16. Id.
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1I.

THE CASE FOR BROAD EXECUTIVE WAR POWERS

Regarding the political question raised by Hamdan concerning the scope of
presidential power during time of war, the Bush Administration's argument was twofold:
first, that the president has inherent authority to convene military tribunals, 1 7 and second,
that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by Congress on
September 18, 2001, served as specific authorization by Congress for such presidential
actions. 18 According to the government,
[t]he AUMF authorized the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force" against
al Qaeda and its supporters. As a plurality of this Court recognized in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
the AUMF thus authorized the19 President to exercise his full war powers in connection with
the conflict against al Qaeda.
And, "[e]ven if Congress's support for the President's Military Order [ 201 were not so
clear, the President has the inherent authority to convene military commissions to try and
punish captured enemy combatants in wartime--even in the absence of any statutory
2
authorization.'" 1
Furthermore, the Administration argued,
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality of this Court concluded that the AUMF authorized the
President to exercise his traditional war powers, and it relied on Quirin for the proposition
that "the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful
combatants, 'universal agreement and
22
practice' are 'important incident[s] of war.'
Essentially, the Administration claimed the power to conduct military tribunals as
deemed necessary by the president was part of the inherent war powers of the president.
The Administration perceives such decisions to be part of the president's inherent
war powers, arguing that
[t]he fact that Congress has not issued a formal declaration of war against al Qaeda is
irrelevant. The President's prerogative to invoke the law of war in a time of armed
conflict, including with respect to the trial and punishment of war criminals, in no way
turns on the existence of such a declaration. The Court in Hamdi rejected a similar
contention and found that the AUMF was
sufficient to confirm Congress's support for the
23
President's exercise of his war powers.
The Bush Administration argues the justification for broad inherent presidential
war powers is also found in the U.S. Constitution: "The President's war power under
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution includes the inherent authority to create military
commissions even in the absence of any statutory authorization, because that
authorization is a necessary and long-standing component of his war powers. ' 24 In
support of this claim, the Bush Administration points to previous uses of military
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Respt.'s Br. 8 (Feb. 23, 2006).
Id. at 7.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
66 Fed. Reg. 57833.
Respt.'s Br., supra n. 17, at 8.
Id. at 16 (citing Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1947)) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 18 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 21 (citation omitted).
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tribunals during war time, such as the use of tribunals by General George Washington
during the Revolutionary War as well as the councils of war convened during the
25
Mexican-American War.
The logic presented to the Supreme Court by the Bush Administration echoes those
of the policy makers who have informed the political and legal decisions that underpin
the on-going "War on Terrorism." John Yoo, a law professor at the University of
California at Berkeley and a deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal
Counsel of the Department of Justice from 2001 to 2003 who was intimately involved in
many of the most controversial decisions of the Bush Administration, has laid bare these
arguments in numerous articles and books. 26 Yoo cites the AUMF of September 18,
2001, as giving the president broad authority to take whatever actions deemed necessary
to combat those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001. 2 7 The Hamdi
decision is seen as fitting with this logic because "the [Supreme Court] implicitly
recognized ... that the United States may use all the tools of war-including detention
without criminal trial-to fight a new kind of enemy." 28 All of this, in Yoo's opinion
and arguably that of the Bush Administration's, gives the president broad inherent and
authorized power to conduct the War on Terror in any way deemed important for the
protection of the country. The U.S. is at war with al Qaeda, and in war different rules
29
apply than in a peacetime domestic situation.
With respect to the use of military tribunals, Yoo writes that the arguments that the
"military commissions violate the Constitution because Congress hasn't approved them
have little merit. It is true that Congress has not passed a law specifically authorizing
military commissions in the war on terrorism, but it never enacted one in World War II
either." 30 In this view, the authority to create the military commissions comes from
three sources: (1) extant congressional authorizations, such as Article 15 of the Articles
of War which has been incorporated into the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ);
(2) the implied authorization contained within AUMF; and (3) the president's inherent
war powers. 31
Yoo claims that "[e]ven if Congress hadn't authorized military
commissions in the UCMJ, President Bush would still have authority to establish them
under his constitutional authority as commander in chief." 32 This inherent power applies
in the course of any and all military actions that are, in any way, authorized by Congress:
Presidents have used military commissions in conflicts without any declaration of war, the
Civil War being the most obvious example, and the Indian wars another. The declarationof-war issue is a red herring. It ignores the fact that presidents have long used military

25. Id. at 21-22.
26. Eg. John Yoo, War by Other Means: An Insider'sAccount of the War on Terror (A. Mthly. Press 2006)
[hereinafter Yoo, War]; Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in InternationalTribunals, 93
Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2005), John C. Yoo, The Continuationof Politicsby Other Means The Original Understanding
of War Powers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 167 (1996).
27. Yoo, War, supra n. 26, at 11-13.
28. Id.
at 14 (emphasis added).
29. Id at 16.
30. Id at 226.
31. Id.at226-27.
32. Yoo, War, supra n. 26, at 226.
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force abroad without congressional approval of any kind.

33

The argument was repeated before the Supreme Court where Paul Clement, the Solicitor
General arguing on behalf of the federal government, claimed that the right to create
military tribunals "is the President invoking an authority that he's exercised in virtually
34
every war that we've had."
This is the essence of the Bush Administration's justification for the president's
right to create military tribunals to try suspected terrorists: Congress has given the
president authorization to do so, but the president does not need such authorization.
Even if authorization was not given to the president, the commissions could be created
anyway. When the country is at war, as in the opinion of the Bush Administration the
United States has been as of September 11, 2001, the president has inherent authority to
35
use any and all of his war powers to take any action required to win the war.
III.

THE HAMDAN DECISION

On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, dealing the Bush Administration a stinging defeat. 36 The opinion, written by
Justice John Paul Stevens, 3 7 held that "the military commission convened to try Hamdan
lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the UCMJ and
the Geneva Conventions." 38 The Court noted that the case was a very important one as
"trial by military commission is an extraordinary measure raising important questions
about the balance of powers in our constitutional structure." 39 Ultimately, the Hamdan
case is important to the development of a more nuanced understanding of the proper
balance between congressional and executive war powers-an understanding made even
more necessary in light of the nebulous nature of the War on Terror, which has no
identifiable end, no observable metrics for victory, and no clear battlefield on which it is
to be fought.
Ultimately, the Court ruled that, although the president's war powers had indeed
been activated and military commissions are generally authorized by Congress, the
president does not have the inherent authority within his war powers to constitute
military tribunals however he sees fit.40 Rather, "the UCMJ, the AUMF, and the DTA
[Detainee Treatment Act] at most acknowledge a general Presidential authority to
convene military commissions in circumstances where justified under the 'Constitution
and laws,' including the law of war." 4 1 Thus, the question fell to the Court whether the
33. Id. at 228.
34. Paul D. Clement, Oral Argument on Behalf of the Respondents 45 (D.C. Mar. 28, 2006) (transcript
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument-transcripts/05-184.pdf).
35. In the words of Solicitor General Paul Clement, "I think the events of 9/11 speak to the fact that this is a
war where the laws of war are involved." Id. at 67.
36. Hamdan, 126 S.Ct 2749.
37. Id. at 2759.
38. Id. Justice Stevens noted that "[f]our of us also conclude ...that the offense with which Hamdan has
been charged is not an 'offens[e] that by ...the law of war may be tried by military commissions." Id at
2759-60. This argument is not, however, germane to this article.
39 Id at 2759.
40. Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. 2749.
41. Id. at 2775.
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military commission in question-the one to which Hamdan was referred-was justified
42
by the existing laws and congressional authorizations. The Court found that it was not.
Thus, in the absence of congressional authorization, the president could not, even though
his war powers had indeed been activated by Congress with the passage of AUMF, take
any action deemed necessary in pursuit of the military or political objectives of the ongoing conflict. 43 Rather, the president is limited, even in wartime, by the will of
Congress.
The Hamdan decision, therefore, represents a confirmation of the understanding of
executive-legislative war powers to be presented herein. The framework argues that,
while the president has wide latitude in the use of U.S. military force even in the absence
of specific congressional authorizations to conduct military operations, his ability to take
actions of legislative nature is more circumscribed by congressional war powers. This
balance of war powers is especially important in a conflict such as the proclaimed War
on Terror, which, due to both its nebulous nature and its domestic component, demands
legislative as well as military strategies.
44

IV.

IMBALANCED WAR POWERS

The Constitution is unclear on how exactly war powers should be balanced
between Congress and the president, especially on whether congressional assent is
required for each deployment of force. Congress is explicitly given the power, in Article
I, Section 8, to declare war, 45 but the meaning of a declaration of war is not spelled out.
Karl Schonberg argues that the Declare War Clause requires Congress' formal assent to
each and every deployment of military force. 46 Similarly, Louis Fisher, a legal scholar
with the Congressional Research Service who focuses on issues of war powers, writes
that the Founding Fathers intended to only give the president the power to repel "sudden
47
attacks" but nothing more in the absence of specific authorization.
However, it is fairly clear now that the president has the power to order American
troops into combat even in the absence of a formal authorization from Congress. During
the debate surrounding the ratification of the UN Charter, Senator Arthur Vandenberg
made clear that
if we were to require the consent of Congress to every use of our armed forces, it would
not only violate the spirit of the [UN] Charter, but it would violate the spirit of the
Constitution of the United States, because under the Constitution the President has certain
rights to use our armed forces in the national defense without consulting Congress....
It is
48

just as much a part of the Constitution as is the congressional fight to declare war.

As evidence, there have been well over 215 instances in which U.S. military forces
42. Id. at 2774-75.
43. Id.
44. The arguments about executive-legislative war powers presented in the following sections have
appeared in substantively similar form in Seth Weinberger, Presidential War Powers in a Never-Ending
War", _ Tul. J. Comp. & Int. L
(forthcoming).
45. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8.
46. See Karl K. Schonberg, Global Security and Legal Restraint, 19 Political Sci. Q. 115 (2004).
47. Louis Fisher, PresidentialWar Power 261 (2d rev. ed., U Kan. Press 2004).
48. Sen. Commn. on For. Rels., Charter of the UnitedNations, 79th Cong. 299 (July 16, 1945).
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49
have been deployed into combat, while Congress has only declared war five times.
Several of those conflicts have been authorized by Congress by means other than a
formal declaration of war, such as the AUMF authorizing President Bush to use force
against al Qaeda and others responsible for the 9/11 attacks and the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution that permitted President Johnson to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In
others, such as the Korean War or the NATO intervention in Kosovo, there was no
specific congressional authorization whatsoever. 50 For example:

Kosovo is just one entry on a long list of presidential uses of forcer since the passage
of the WPR [War Powers Resolution] that occurred without benefit of congressional
authorization. Even an abbreviated litany would have to include Lebanon, Iran, Grenada,
throughout the
the Persian Gulf (in 1987-88), Libya, Panama, Somalia, Iraq (in 1993 5and
1
"no-fly-zone" period), Haiti, Bosnia, Sudan, and Afghanistan (in 1998).
By taking little to no action in the face of the long-standing tradition of presidential
deployment of force without legislative approval, Congress has essentially resolved the
political question concerning the initiation of hostilities by creating a "gloss" on the
Constitution

which,

in the

words of Supreme

Court Justice

Felix Frankfurter's

concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case, consists of
a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress
and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power art of the structure of our
'
government, may be treated as a gloss on "executive power.
By sitting back and refusing to assert any power that it might possess, Congress has
agreed that such unilateral deployments of force by the president are part of executive
53

power.
However, even if the critics of an executive right, whether constitutional or created

49. For a list of all uses of force by the United States, review Richard F. Grmmett, Instances of Use of
United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2004, http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/forces.htm
(accessed Mar. 8, 2007). The U.S. Congress has declared war five times: the War of 1812, the SpanishAmerican War, the Mexican-American War, World War 1, and World War II. Id.
50. John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11, at 143 (U.
Chi. Press 2005). The Kosovo intervention has been called "one of the most flagrant acts of usurpation of the
war power in the history of the republic." David Gray Adler, The Clinton Theory of the War Power, 30 Pres.
Studs. Q. 155 (2000).
51. Andrew Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing PresidentialPower after Watergate 192
(U. Mich. Press 2005) (footnote omitted).
52. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952).
53. Even the passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973 does not challenge the long pattern of
executive action. Congress has not once attempted to restrain a presidential deployment of force using the
Resolution, while
[e]very President from President Nixon forward has taken the position that the War Powers
Resolution is an unconstitutional infringement on the authority of the President, as Commander-inChief, to utilize the Armed Forces of the United States to defend what he determines are the vital
national security interests of the United States.
Richard F. Grimmett, CRS Report for Congress- Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs since 1970 Involving
U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Deployments (Jan. 10, 2001) (available at http://www.fas.org/man/
crs/RS20775.pdf). In fact, the passage and subsequent non-enforcement of the War Powers Act reinforces the
gloss rather than challenges it. For more on presidential non-compliance with the War Powers Resolution,
review Rudalevige, supra n. 51, at 192-200. For more on congressional silence in the face of presidential
deployments of U.S. military force, review Adler, supra n. 50, at 155-56, n. 1.
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by congressional inactions, to deploy force without congressional approval are correct
that the Constitution requires congressional authorization of all uses of force, that
54
authorization need not come in a formal declaration of war. Mitchell v. Laird
established the principle that congressional authorization of the use of force may take
other forms than a formal declaration of war. In a unanimous decision, the court stated
that that "it is constitutionally permissible for Congress to use another means than a
formal declaration of war to give its approval to a war" 55 and that "any attempt to require
a declaration of war as the only permissible form of assent might involve unforeseeable
domestic and international consequences." 56 Furthermore, the court held that the
question to be determined
manner in which Congress may give that assent is a political
57
branches.
legislative
and
executive
the
of
by the interactions
In what ways, other than a formal declaration of war, might Congress give its
approval for a presidential deployment of U.S. military force? Building off of Justice
Frankfurter's concept of the creation of a "gloss" on the Constitution as well as the longstanding practice of deployment of force without specific authorization, one form of
"alternative authorization" can be discerned. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
gives Congress the power to raise and support the armed forces of the United States with
appropriations for no longer than two years and to make rules for the governance and
regulation of the land and naval forces. 58 The appropriations process is well understood
to be a tool by which Congress can control the use of military force by the president.
Holtzman v. Schlesinger59 established the principle that congressional appropriations of
60
the military can in fact constitute a form of authorization for the conduct of hostilities.
The court found that
Congress in appropriation bills from 1965 through 1969 had shown "its continued support
of the Vietnam action" and that Congress' choice of appropriations bills rather than a
formal declaration of war to effectuate its intent involved a political question which did not
prevent the finding that the fighting in Vietnam was authorized by Congress and that such
fighting was not a usurpation of power by either of the Presidents who had been in office
after 1964.61

Thus, if Congress is opposed to a particular use of military force by the president,
it has the constitutional right to cut off funding to the troops or to designate that monies
a tactic was ultimately used by Congress to
cannot be used in a specified conflict. Such
62
end U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.
Furthermore, Spaulding v. Douglass Aircraft gives Congress broad discretionary
powers over military appropriations. Specifically, the court stated that

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Id. at 615.
Id.
Id. at 616.
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8(b).
361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
Id.
Id. at 561-62.
Grimmett, supra n. 53, at 1-2.
60 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Cal. 1945), affd, 154 F.2d419 (9th Cir. 1946).
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Congress in making appropriations has the power and authority not only to designate
the purpose of the appropriation, but also the terms and conditions under which the
executive department ... may expend such appropriations....
The purpose of appropriations, the terms and conditions under which said
appropriations were made is a matter solely in the hands of Congress and it is the plain and
explicit duty of the executive branch to comply with the same.
This power has been used by Congress to prohibit specific activities, such as when,
in 1984, Congress passed the Boland Amendment which forbade the president from
using monies to fund the Nicaraguan contra rebels. 65 Such power of the purse is clearly
and explicitly given to Congress and serves as a broad and effective means by which the
legislative branch can exercise restraint on the executive branch, limiting or even
forbidding federal funds to be used in particular ways.
The Holtzman decision did note that "appropriations bills do not necessarily
66
indicate an open-ended approval of all military operations which may be conducted."
Merely funding a standing army or not enacting fiscal impediments to the use of the U.S.
military is not enough to argue that Congress has assented, either tacitly or overtly, to
each and every use of American military might by the president. However, the
constitutional "gloss" discussed by Justice Frankfurter helps discern a larger argument
for a broad understanding of the executive power to use force without specific and
particular congressional authorization each time. Given the congressional ability to use
the power of the purse to control presidential uses of force (and the implications of the
non-use of said power); given that Congress has not once attempted to force a president
to comply with the War Powers Resolution of 1973; given that every president has stated
that he does not believe himself to be bound by the War Powers Resolution and that the
resolution is not constitutional; and given the long-standing historical pattern of
presidentially deployed force without specific authorization from Congress, it is not
difficult to perceive that a gloss has in fact developed on executive-legislative war
powers. The logic of this gloss gives the president broad latitude in the deployment and
use of American military force without needing to ask Congress for a declaration of war
or any other specific approval or authorization.
This argument finds support in the Steel Seizure Case, normally cited as a blow to
executive power and a reaffirmation of the role of Congress (indeed, this point shall be
67
in which "[the president] and
made below). Justice Jackson's "zone of twilight"
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain" seems

64. Id. at 988.
65 The Boland Amendment was attached to the 1984 Defense Appropriations Act and stated,
[n]one of the funds provided in this act may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency of the
Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military training or advice, or other support
for military activities, to any group or individual, not part of a country's armed forces, for the
purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between
Nicaragua and Honduras.
Govt. Accountability Off., Report B-201260 (Sept. 11, 1984) (available at http://redbook.gao.gov/
14/fl0067296.php).
66. 361 F. Supp. at 562.
67. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637
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to apply here. 68 When authority is unclear, as it certainly has become in light of
presidential use of force,
congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this
area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives
of events and
69
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
In other words, congressional silence in the face of an assertion of presidential
power can serve as acceptance of that power or even as a delegation of authority. In the
case of presidential war powers, Congress certainly seems to h'we devolved any control
70
over the deployment of military force that it might have been argued to possess.
However, this gloss has produced a gross imbalance between Congress and the
president concerning war powers that has directly contributed to controversial, and
recently overturned, executive actions, such as the domestic wiretapping operation
conducted by the National Security Agency 71 or the attempt to try those suspected of
involvement with al Qaeda, such as Hamdan, in military tribunals. Once one takes the
position that Congress has authorized the president to use his full complement of war
powers, extending that power into other areas is not far behind. For example, John Yoo
writes, "Congress also implicitly authorized the President to carry out electronic
surveillance to prevent further attacks on the United States in the Authorization for the
Use of Military Force passed on September 18, 2001. " 72 More directly to the point of
the convening of military tribunals, Yoo goes on to note that the power to commit
Hamdan and other suspected terrorists to military tribunals comes directly from "[the
president's] authority as commander in chief."' 73 As has been noted above, the recent
history of war powers has been one of the steady accretions of power in the hands of the
executive and the gradual diminishing of the role of Congress. While this has certain
advantages, it also poses a particular problem in the on-going War on Terror.
V.

RESTORING THE BALANCE: THE IMPORT OF HAMDAN

On September 20, 2001, President Bush, in an address to a joint session of
Congress, publicly proclaimed that the United States, as a result of the attacks of
September 11, 2001, was now fighting a "War on Terrorism." 74 In this war, as
acknowledged by President Bush, a large part of the fighting will be within the United

68. Id.

69. Id.
70. For more on the argument that Congress has effectively devolved the power to initiate hostilities to the
president, review Barbara Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the
Assertive Congress 195-203 (U. Chi. Press 1994); Rudalevige, supra n. 51, at 192-200; James L. Sundquist,
The Decline and Resurgence of Congress 110-26, 265-72 (Brookings Instn. Press 1981). See also supra nn. 2,

26, and 29.
71. Eric Lichtblau, Conflict of Interest Is Raised in Eavesdropping Ruling, N.Y. Times A 19 (Aug. 23,
2006); Adam Liptak & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Judge Finds Wiretap Actions Violate the Law, N.Y. Times AI
(Aug. 18, 2006).
72. Yoo, War, supra n. 26, at 115.

73. Id. at 238.
74. George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (D.C., Sept. 20,

2001) (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html).
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States itself and use tools not traditionally considered to be part of a military response:
Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take
defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today, dozens of federal
departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities
affecting homeland security. These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. So
tonight I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me-the
Office of Homeland Security.
We will come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track down
terror here at home. We will come together to strengthen our intelligence 75
capabilities to
know the plans of terrorists before they act, and find them before they strike.
The domestic component of the war, along with the belief in broad and largely unfettered
presidential war powers, led to Congress being largely shut out of the loop because the
legislative body was not consulted regarding the National Security Agency domestic
surveillance operation or the establishment of military tribunals to try Hamdan and other
suspected terrorists.
Nevertheless, there is broad recognition that Congress has a valuable and essential
role to play in a war like the War on Terror. In his concurrence to the Steel Seizure
decision of Youngstown, Justice Jackson wrote that the historical experience of other
nations' dealings with the question of the domestic applicability of war powers "suggests
that emergency powers are consistent with free government only when their control is
lodged elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them." 76 Furthermore, "[w]ith all
its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long
preserving free government except that the
Executive be under the law, and that the law
77
be made by parliamentary deliberations."
The question in the Steel Seizure case was whether President Truman could,
pursuant to his war powers in the Korean War-a conflict not declared or otherwise
specifically authorized by Congress-seize steel mills, the product of which was deemed
essential to the war effort, in the U.S. to force striking workers back to their jobs. 78 The
decision was struck down as it was, in Justice Black's opinion, "lawmaking, a legislative
function which the Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the
President." 7 9 And "[i]n the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see
80
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."
Furthermore,
[t]he order [to seize the mills] cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the
President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.... Even though
"theater of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional
system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 652.
Id.at 655.
Id. at 582.
Id.
Id. at 587.
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such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping
production. This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities.
Thus, even though the nation was undoubtedly engaged in a war, the president's inherent
war powers as Commander in Chief could not be understood to extend into lawmaking, a
power specifically reserved for Congress.
The concurrence of Justice Douglas supports this critical distinction between
military actions and lawmaking: "The legislative nature of the action taken by the
President seems to me to be clear. ' 82 Justice Jackson goes further, writing,
[t]he essence of our free Government is "leave to live by no man's leave, underneath the
law"-to be governed by those impersonal forces which we call law.... The Executive,
except for recommendation and veto, has no legislative power. The executive action we
have here originates in83 the individual will of the President and represents an exercise of
authority without law.
Again, the president has no inherent power to take actions of a legislative nature unless
ordered or authorized to do so by Congress.
The notion that executive and legislative powers must remain separated lies at the
very heart of the philosophical underpinnings of American constitutional democracy. In
Federalist Paper 47, James Madison wrote, "the accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny. ' 84 Justice Jackson echoed this fear, noting that President Truman's bid to seize
the steel mills amounted to an attempt to claim legislative power for the executive branch
under the aegis of war powers:
But no doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me more sinister and
alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled,
and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the
85
country by his own commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign venture.
When the president wants to take an action of an inherent legislative nature pursuant to
his powers as Commander in Chief, he must have express and explicit permission from
Congress.
However, it is neither likely to be prudent nor expedient for a wartime president to
seek specific authorization from Congress for each and every act of a legislative nature
that he believes necessary for the prosecution of hostilities. Congress is a slow,
deliberative body that is not likely to be capable of sufficiently rapid decision making in
times of crisis. However, an option does exist whereby the president may request a
broad and open-ended authorization from Congress to take legislative actions-a formal
declaration of war. The Hamdan decision and the War on Terror more generally have
refocused attention and refurbished the luster on this little-used and oft-forgotten

81. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587.
82. Id. at 630
83. Id at 654-55.
84. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay, No. 47. Madison, in The FederalistPapers 300, 303
(Clinton Rossiter ed., New Am. Lib. 1961).
85. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 642.
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component of congressional war powers by virtue of requiring, in the opinion of the
Executive Branch, legislative actions.
If the president's inherent war powers give him the right to deploy force without
specific authorization from Congress, then what good is the constitutionally delegated
power to declare war? The answer lies in Bas v. Tingy,86 a Supreme Court decision from
1800. In this decision, the Court established that there are two distinct states of warimperfect and perfect. 87 An imperfect war is one in which war is not formally declared
and yet "it is public war, because it is an external contention by force." 88 Imperfect wars
are wars "though all the members are not authorized to commit hostilities such as in a
89
solemn [perfect] war."
Imperfect wars are contrasted with perfect wars, in which war is formally declared.
In a perfect war,
one whole nation is at war with another whole nation; and all the members of the nation
declaring war, are authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of the other, in
every place, and under every circumstance. In such a war all the members act under
a
90
general authority, and all the rights and consequences of war attach to their condition.
In a perfect, or formally declared, war, the entire energy of the nation is directed towards
the war effort, while in an imperfect war, the war effort is limited and restrained by
existing domestic law. 9 1 Almost all uses of force by the U.S. military are imperfect
wars, rather than perfect wars, meaning that the war powers of the president are limited.
If the president wishes to expand the breadth of those war powers, he must ask Congress
to declare war.
This logic is supported by the majority opinion and the dissent by Justice Nelson in
the Prize Cases.92 Justice Nelson described the nature of a declared war as including the
citizens of the warring nations becoming enemies, the suspension of all legal contracts, a
right of interdiction of trade and commerce into the enemy nation, the ability to capture
93
and confiscate the property of the enemy, and the right to blockade ports.
Furthermore, Justice Nelson wrote that
[n]o power short of [a congressional declaration of war] can change the legal status of the
Government or the relations of its citizens from that of peace to a state of war.... The war
power of the Government must be exercised
before this changed condition of the
94
Government and people... can be admitted.

86. 4 U.S. 37 (1800).
87. Id. at 38.
88. Id. at 40.
89. Id at40-41.
90. Id. at 40 (emphasis in original).
91. Bas, 4 U.S. at 40-41.
92. 67 U.S. 635 (1862). The majority decision in the Prize Cases found that previous congressional
legislation, including the Acts of Congress of February 28, 1795, and March 3, 1806, served as a declaration of
war for the Civil War by expressly giving the president the power to use the U.S military in case of invasion or
insurrection. Justice Nelson's dissent rejected that decision, arguing that a state of war did not exist between
the warring parties until the Act of Congress on July 13, 1861. However, the majority opinion and the dissent
both agreed on the substantive point made most clear in Justice Nelson's opinion and cited here.
93. Id at 687.
94. Id. at 689.
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One critical difference between a perfect or declared war and an imperfect or
undeclared war is the ability of the president to act in a legislative manner. A war in the
formal sense involves a significantly higher intensity of hostilities than in an imperfect
war and thus requires the effort, focus, and resources of the entire country. A formal
declaration of war, which creates a legal state of war, affects both domestic and
international law, subordinating both to the war effort, and broadens the scope of
presidential power to allow for a more complete and effective national effort in the
prosecution of the conflict. Thus, in a formal state of war, a president is allowed to
suspend habeas corpus, seize property needed for the war effort, ration food and
materiel, or intern large segments of American citizens. When the country is not in a
state of war by virtue of a formal declaration of war, the ability of the president to take
such legislative actions is restricted and limited. Without a declaration of war, a
president is not allowed to seize steel mills, conduct warrantless wiretapping of
American citizens, indefinitely detain those suspected of terrorism, or change the
established rules for the use of military tribunals.
The Bush Administration implicitly acknowledged this logic in the Hamdan case
by making the argument that the country was indeed in a state of war by virtue of the
95
attacks of September 11, 2001, and the passage of AUMF on September 18, 2001.
However, as noted earlier, the Court struck down the military commissions on the
grounds that congressional statutes and international legal commitments (the Geneva
Conventions 96) existed that spelled out the procedures and rules that must be followed in
the use of military commissions and that "the military commission convened to try
Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the
UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions." 97 The Court went on to note that "there is nothing
in the text or legislative history of the AUMF even hinting that Congress intended to
expand or alter the authorization set forth in Article 21 of the UCMJ." 9 8 Thus, even
though the Court "assume[d] that the AUMF activated the President's war powers," 99
"[n]either of these congressional Acts [the AUMF or the DTA] expands the President's
authority to convene military commissions." 10 0 Thus, the Court explicitly recognized
that the president's war powers do not inherently involve the right to take legislative
10 1
actions. Rather, that power must be specifically granted to the president by Congress.
How can legislative power be granted to the president? Must the president during
wartime come to Congress and request specific legislation for each and every legislative
action he wishes to take in pursuit of victory? The answer presented herein is yes, unless
Congress, realizing that the level of danger to the country is high and that the legislative
process is too slow to successfully confront the extant threats, has in some way given
broad authorization to the president to take such actions. A formal declaration of war

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507; Respt.'s Br., supra n. 17, at 2; 66 Fed. Reg. 57833.
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749.
Id.at 2759.
Id. at 2775.
Id
Id.
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749.
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serves this very purpose.
The decision of Bas v. Tingy makes it clear that there are crucial differences in the
size and scope of perfect and imperfect wars, the latter of which requires that the power
of the president be restrained and limited. Some wars, however, are so threatening to the
national interest that they must be fought in a different manner. It is inconceivable that
the U.S. could have successfully prosecuted either World War I or II without massive
contributions and sacrifices from the home front, many of which came about through
presidential initiative. Accordingly, both World Wars I and II were fought under formal
declarations of war that permitted the presidents to take legislative actions such as
establishing rationing patterns, seizing industries, censoring potentially seditious
material, and interning Japanese Americans living on the West Coast. 10 2 But, can it be
argued that Congress explicitly intended to authorize such actions by the president and
cede legislative power?
The declarations of war for World Wars I and II contain particular and specific
language that provides evidence of Congress' intention to cede legislative power to the
president in recognition of the unlimited scope, size, and potential threat of the conflicts.
The language is found at the end of the declarations of war against Germany in both wars
and against Japan and Italy in World War II:
the state of war between the United States and the [specified country] which has thus been
thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby
authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the [United States
and the resources of the] government to carry on war against the [specified country]; and to
bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby
pledged by the Congress of the United States. 103
By pledging "the resources of the Government" and "all of the resources of the
country" to the president, Congress has recognized that in the current conflict the war
effort will require extraordinary powers to be placed in the hands of the Commander in
Chief. 104
When the country is embroiled in a conflict that is sufficiently threatening to

102. William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime 170-202 (Alfred P. Knopf

1998).
103. Formal U.S. Declaration of War with Germany (Apr. 6, 1917) (available at http://firstworldwar.com/
source/usofficialawardeclaration.htm); U.S. Declaration of War against Germany (Dec. 11, 1941) (available at
http://www.law.ou.edu/ushistory/germwar.shtml); Congressional Declaration of War on Japan (Dec. 8, 1941)
(available at http://www law.ou.edu/ushistory/japwar.shtml); Declarations of a State of War with Japan,

Germany, and Italy (available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/dec/dec05.htm) (War with Italy was
declared on Dec. 11, 1941.).
104. Note that while the declarations of war for the War of 1812 and the Mexican- and Spanish-American
Wars do formally declare the existence of a state of war, they do not contain the language about ceding all the
resources of the country to the president. But this should not be surprising. The concept of "total" war did not
really come into existence until the beginning of the twentieth century, and World War I represents the first real
total war. Furthermore, during the nineteenth century, the U.S. did not yet possess the domestic infrastructure
or capability to mobilize much power from the home front. Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The
Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton U. Press 1998). Because these three wars were not
fought in the same way as the wars of the twentieth century, the absence of the "resources of the country"
language does not undo the argument. For discussions of total war, review Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of
Achilles. War, Peace, and the Course of History 196 (Alfred P. Knopf 2002); B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy 33844 (2d rev. ed., Praegar 1967); Karl von Clausewitz, On War (O.J. Matthijs Jolles trans., Random House 1976).
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warrant the existence of a state of war, the president must be able to call upon legislative
powers without waiting for specific congressional approval of each action. Without a
declaration of war a president may not seize a domestic industry, even one crucial to the
war effort, as President Truman tried to do during the Korean War; 10 5 with a declaration
of war a president can order the internment of more than 100,000 American citizens,
conduct warrantless surveillance, seize property, divert industrial assets to the war effort,
and appropriate transportation systems.l°6 Thus, as John Yoo writes:
Even the Supreme Court has suggested that in times of declared war, certain actions by the
federal government would survive strict scrutiny but would certainly fail if attempted in
peacetime....
One doubts whether the courts would have allowed the wholesale
internment of Panamanian Americans during the 1989 Panama War, or of Yugoslavs
during the Kosovo conflict, or of all Iraqi Americans during the recent invasion and
occupation of Iraq. Only a declaration of war from Congress could trigger and permit such
extreme measures reserved only for total war. 107
Should the AUMF of September 18, 2001, be interpreted as the functional
equivalent of a declaration of war, as argued by the Bush Administration (and John
Yoo)? 10 8 AUMF contains none of the critical language found in the formal declarations
of war. It does not mention the existence of a state of war. It does not talk of
committing the resources of the Government or "all the resources of the country" to the
war effort. Rather, AUMF states that
the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United
109
States by such nations, organizations, or persons.
This language cannot be read as creating a state of war, ceding power or authority
to the executive, or functioning more generally as a declaration of war. While the
president is authorized to use force in defense of the nation, he is not given the power to
act in a legislative manner and thus does not have the right to supersede, bypass, or
transform existing laws.
In the absence of a declaration of war, the logic of Youngstown 110 holds sway over
presidential decision making because it requires a determination of whether Congress has
acted in a particular issue area. If it has, then the president may not act contrary to the
law. Thus in Hamdan, given the existence of UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions, both
of which spelled out the rules and procedures of using military tribunals, the president's
action fell into Justice Jackson's third category of "practical situations" when "the
President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of

105.
106.
107.
108
109.
110.

Youngstown, 343 U.S.at 579.
Yoo, supra n. 50, at 151.
Id. at 151-52.
Review supra notes 3 and 9.
Pub L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
343 U.S. 579.
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Congress."'1 1 In such cases, presidential "power is at its lowest ebb" and "[p]residential
claim to a power . . . must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the

' 1
equilibrium established by our constitutional system. 12
The question of whether Hamdan would have been decided differently in the case
of a formal declaration of war by Congress is unresolved. But the argument presented in
this article suggests that under a declaration of war the military commission established
to try Hamdan would have been permitted. A declaration of war focuses the collective
attention of Congress on the question of whether a state of war should be declared and
thus would involve different deliberations and rationales than a more limited
authorization of force. In the analysis presented herein, Hamdan serves to restore a
much needed balance to war powers, bringing back a policy-relevant and constitutionally
vital role to Congress.

VI.

CONCLUSION:

A BALANCE RESTORED

In his concurrence to the Youngstown decision, Justice Jackson wrote that "[t]he
tendency is strong to emphasize transient results upon policies ...

and lose sight of

enduring consequences upon the balanced power structure of our Republic."' 1 13 Indeed,
this warning seems particularly prescient in the context of the on-going War on Terror.
Even if the threat of al Qaeda is existential, as has been claimed by President Bush and
supporters, it does not necessarily follow that the president should be freed from
congressional restraints to pursue whatever strategies and implement whatever policies
he deems necessary to fight that threat. 114 In a "normal" war, like either of the two
World Wars, an end can be envisioned, metrics can be created for assessing progress
towards that end, and the extraordinary legislative powers ceded to the president by
Congress can one day be given back when the war is over.
However, the War on Terror is not such a war. The enemy is unclear, does not
wear uniforms, and may be living and operating among American citizens. The goal of
the war is unclear as well. Is the purpose of the War on Terror to defeat all terrorism, to
reduce terrorism to a manageable threat, or simply to lower the likelihood of another
large-scale attack? The metrics are largely unknowable, making it difficult to determine
whether the U.S. is winning. Does the absence of an attack against the U.S. since 9/11
mean that the war has been successful or that the terrorists have diverted their energies
elsewhere? Which component of the War on Terror has been the most responsible for
protecting the nation? At what point could victory, if victory is even possible, be
declared and any extraordinary legislative powers be returned to Congress by the
president?
In such a murky political and military situation, the burden of caution weighs
against a broad interpretation of executive power and recommends against granting the

Ill. Id. at 635,637.
112. Id. at 637-38.
113. Id at 634.
114. In his address to Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush asserted that "[t]hese terrorists kill
not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life" and that "what is at stake is not just America's
freedom" but also "progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom." Bush, supran. 74.
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president a "blank check" to act as he sees fit without congressional supervision.
Turning back once more to the Youngstown concurrence of Justice Jackson, we repeat
Jackson's warning against just such a scenario:
no doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem ...more sinister and alarming
than that a President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often
even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by
his own commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign venture. 115
Noble goals and successful policies cannot be the arbiters of a policy's legality and
constitutionality. The power to make and define the country's laws, even during
wartime, rests solely with Congress and must do so in order to preserve the delicate
balance of power and authority that defines American constitutional democracy.
In the absence of a threat that demands in the determination of Congress the
creation of a legal state of war, the president must not and cannot take actions of a
legislative nature. If the laws as they stand do not suit the strategy of the conflict, the
president must go to Congress and ask for the laws to be changed. This is exactly what
happened in the aftermath of Hamdan. 116 Once the claim to inherent power was struck
down, President Bush asked for and was granted by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives the types of military commissions he believed to be necessary for the
prosecution of the War on Terror. 117 In this way, legislative power remains in the hands
of the legislature as a check on the unfettered powers of the executive.
In a war like the War on Terror with no end in sight and no real metrics for victory,
policy must flow from process. Extreme caution must be taken before handing this
President (or any president) unmonitored and sweeping legislative power. The decision
in Hamdan is vitally important as it restores the balance to congressional-executive war
powers, ensuring that the separation of powers, which forms the essence of American
constitutional democracy, will not be undone.

115. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 642 (footnote omitted).
116. Charles Babington & Jonathon Weisman, Senate Approves Detainee Bill Backed by Bush, Wash. Post
AI (Sept. 29, 2006).
117. Id
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